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Fulfilling promises of more substantive democracy? Post-neoliberalism and 
natural resource governance in South America  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Benefitting from the commodity boom progressive governments across South America 
have sought to move away from the neoliberal policies adopted previously by 
strengthening the role of the state and using revenues from commodity exports to 
address social concerns. This approach, often called neo-extractivism, has become 
the main development strategy over the past 15 years. Yet, the increasingly intensive 
and extensive natural resource exploitation underlying this development strategy has 
also led to multiple protests and contestations across South America. This paper thus 
examines the relationship between neo-extractivism as a development strategy and the 
quality of democracy under progressive governments in South America. On the one 
hand, neo-extractivism has allowed states to become more inclusive by paying 
attention to social concerns which in turn has been an important element in the 
legitimacy of progressive governments. On the other hand, the reliance on neo-
extractivism as the main development strategy poses important constraints on the 
ability of post-neoliberal states to build more substantive democracies which could 
take into account a variety of positions, give citizens a say in decisions directly 
affecting their livelihoods and promote public debates on key questions confronting 
society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past 15 years a wave of Left or Left-of-centre governments have come to 
power in a majority of South American countries, starting with the election of the late 
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998. While these include very diverse governments, a 
crucial shared element is the commitment to reducing poverty and inequality as well 
as deepening democracy (Cannon and Kirby, 2012; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012; 
Panizza, 2009: 168–196). In an effort to move away from the neoliberal policy agenda 
that characterised the previous decades, progressive governments have reinforced the 
role of the state in order to target social concerns. Taking advantage of the commodity 
boom they have pursued a new strategy for economic and social development by 
using revenues from natural resource exports for much needed social programmes. 
Gudynas (2009) describes this as the neo-extractivism of progressive governments 
which combines old practices of natural resource exploitation with new social policies 
and a stronger role of the state. In this model income generated from export-led 
growth based on primary products has become the basis for economic and social 
development. This has led political leaders and some analysts to proclaim a new 
‘post-neoliberal’ era  (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012; Haarstad, 2012a; Riggirozzi and 
Tussie, 2012). However, post-neoliberalism does not represent a complete rupture 
with the past, but is better understood as ‘an evolution, shaped by legacies of past 
development trajectories, pragmatism, ad hoc policy making and responses to global 
and regional politics.’ (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012: 184). 
 
In this context of continuity and change, the impacts of neo-extractivism as a 
development strategy have been complex and contradictory, particularly in relation to 
the quality of democracy. On the one hand, progressive governments have been 
successful in achieving some of their social objectives, notably decreasing poverty 
and inequality rates (Burchardt and Dietz, 2014: 473–474; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 
2012: 10). This has made South American post-neoliberal states more inclusive and 
has increased the legitimacy of progressive governments and of the development 
strategy adopted (Gudynas, 2009). On the other hand, governments across South 
America have repeatedly faced protests in relation to projects associated with the 
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exploitation of natural resources. Well-known cases include the protests against the 
Belo Monte dam and other hydropower developments in Brazil (Peters, 2011), the 
demonstrations against the construction of a highway in order to facilitate the 
transport of commodities through a protected area and indigenous territory, known as 
the TIPNIS, in Bolivia (Humphreys Bebbington and Bebbington, 2012: 25–28), the 
road blocks maintained for several years by a protest movement in Argentina against 
the construction of a large-scale pulp mill on the Uruguay River (Bueno, 2010: 171–
187; Waisbord and Peruzzotti, 2009), the civil society initiatives aimed at preventing 
the drilling for oil in the Yasuní national park in Ecuador (Certomà and Greyl, 2012) 
and wide-spread opposition to the Initiative for the Integration of Regional 
Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) which includes a number of projects 
designed to facilitate the transport and export of commodities (Hochstetler, 2011: 
144).  
 
Clearly, the South American trend of relying on intensive resource exploitation as a 
development strategy is not uncontested despite its achievements in terms of 
economic growth and some social policies. In the first instance the various protests 
over resource exploitation of course reflect the concerns of communities directly 
affected and those wishing to promote socio-environmental concerns. However, taken 
together, the multiple contestations across South America also uncover shortcomings 
in the way liberal democracy functions and the difficulties of post-neoliberal states to 
take the various concerns expressed by civil society over resource governance into 
account. It is thus striking that citizens and civil society organisations do not 
necessarily advocate a complete stop to all resource exploitation, but rather demand a 
say in the location and extent of particular projects, as well as mitigation of negative 
impacts and a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of intensive resource 
exploitation. While democracy has become embedded in South America and all 
countries hold regular elections and have formal democratic institutions, the multiple 
contestations over resource governance demonstrate citizen demands which go 
beyond casting a vote for designated representatives in elections every few years. 
Instead, citizens demand to have say in decisions directly impacting on their 
livelihoods and contribute to major debates in society. Such demands go beyond the 
existence of formal democratic institutions and are better understood through the 
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notion of substantive democracy which highlights the need for meaningful 
participation in key decisions (Grugel, 2001: 5–6; Kaldor and Vejvoda, 1997). 
 
The aim of this paper is thus to examine the relationship between neo-extractivism as 
a development strategy and the quality of democracy. I focus in particular on the 
progressive governments of South America due to their self-stated commitment to 
deepening democracy. While several studies have examined resource conflicts in the 
Andean-Amazonian countries (Bebbington, 2012a; Haarstad, 2012b; Veltmeyer and 
Petras, 2014), this paper looks at trends in South America as a whole drawing on 
evidence from the extraction of sub-soil resources in the Andean-Amazonian 
countries; the expansion of large-scale and intensive agricultural production based on 
the heavy use of agro-chemicals and genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) in the 
Southern Cone; and regional cooperation on natural resource governance. Whereas 
the quality of democracy in individual countries varies depending on a number of 
factors which go beyond the scope of this paper, the analysis uncovers a common 
trend that relying on neo-extractivism as the main strategy for development limits the 
possibilities available to post-neoliberal states in terms of building more substantive 
democracies. As neo-extractivism depends on increasingly intensive and extensive 
resource exploitation, it is hard to reconcile with the various concerns expressed by 
civil society as these would require setting some limitations to resource exploitation. 
While few limitations have been set during the commodity boom, these become even 
less politically feasible when prices fall. This is by no means relevant only for South 
America. In the context of high global commodity prices extractivism also presents an 
attractive source of income in other parts of the world and the path taken by South 
American progressive governments has given some grounds for hope that it is 
possible to pursue both, economic and social development. Examining this model in 
more detail and its impact on the quality of democracy is therefore highly relevant 
also for other countries. 
 
In the following section I examine in more detail how neo-extractivism has become 
the main strategy for development through a combination of factors; the substantial 
increases in natural resource exploitation often promoted by state institutions; the use 
of revenues from the sector for social programmes; and the absence of other 
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development strategies, most notably changes in the taxation systems. The subsequent 
section then turns to the impact of neo-extractivism on the quality of democracy. In 
order to understand this, it is helpful to break down the concept of democracy into 
different components. This shows that on the one hand states have become more 
inclusive and there have been increases in the legitimacy of governments, to a large 
extent due to the successful social programmes, as well as important changes in 
formal rules and rights benefitting previously highly marginalised groups. On the 
other hand, important limitations in relation to the practices of decision-making over 
resource exploitation remain and these have caused multiple protests. While 
contestations come from a range of different perspectives, citizens and civil society 
organisations regularly demand a say in decisions with very direct impacts on their 
livelihoods and often put forward alternative conceptions of development and 
sustainability. Yet, governments do not encourage public debates on natural resource 
governance and the development model adopted, and instead use a variety of 
discourses which justify intensive resource exploitation and sideline critical voices. 
Moreover, while some state institutions have been established for socio-
environmental concerns and participation mechanisms, these frequently do not 
function effectively and where interests conflict, those institutions promoting 
intensive resource exploitation tend to maintain the upper hand. All of this 
demonstrates that due to their adherence to neo-extractivism as the main strategy for 
development, progressive governments struggle to build more substantive 
democracies which would allow citizens to participate consistently in decisions 
directly affecting them and contribute to key debates in society. This also means that a 
redistribution of power relating to the control over natural resources has remained 
very limited. While South American countries do exhibit some aspects of rentier 
states (Burchardt and Dietz, 2014: 477; Weyland, 2009), this complex and 
contradictory picture suggests that there is no linear or straightforward relationship 
between natural resource wealth and democracy.  
 
NEO-EXTRACTIVISM AS A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY  
 
Neo-extractivism has become the main strategy of progressive governments for 
economic and social development. This is evident in three trends observable across 
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South America; first the substantial increases in natural resource exports over the last 
decade often promoted by government policies and state institutions; second social 
programmes building on revenues from natural resources; and third the absence of 
other strategies to address social concerns and inequality. While there are of course 
important variations between countries and economic sectors, these three aspects 
reflect developments across South America and thus provide evidence of a regional 
trend where neo-extractivism has become the main strategy for development 
(Burchardt and Dietz, 2014).  
 
The export of natural resources is of course not a new phenomenon for South America 
and dates back to colonial times when Latin America became inserted into the global 
economy primarily as a commodity exporter to Europe (Galeano, 1973). However, as 
a result of high global prices and increasing demand from China the last 15 years have 
seen a trend of ‘reprimarisation’ (Svampa, 2012: 17) where South American countries 
have increasingly focussed on the production of primary commodities with little 
added value destined for export. Increases in natural resource exploitation are evident 
on a number of levels, including the volumes extracted, the share of commodities 
relative to other exports and the extent of areas used for resource exploitation. 
Primary commodities have come to represent a central and increasingly important 
economic sector for the region whose proportion in the total exports had reached over 
80 per cent in a majority of South American countries by 2012 (ECLAC, 2013: 111). 
Due to the growing importance of China as a trading partner, the production of 
primary products has also increased in Brazil, the largest country in South America 
with the most diversified economy and export sector (Hochstetler, 2013: 40).  
 
In the Andean-Amazonian countries, subsoil resources such as petroleum, gas and 
metals account for the largest share of resource exploitation. In Ecuador for example 
two-thirds of the Amazon has been designated for oil exploration and in Bolivia over 
half of the national territory has been marked as open to hydrocarbon exploitation 
(Bebbington, 2012b: 13). Meanwhile the Southern Cone countries have seen 
significant increases in the production and export of agricultural commodities, most 
notably soybean, but also sugarcane in the case of Brazil. Over the last decade 
agricultural exports have become highly profitable because of high global demand for 
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biofuels and animal feed from countries in the global North and China as well as the 
introduction of new technologies, notably GMOs. In this context soybean has become 
the most important agricultural export of the Southern Cone countries. Argentinean 
exports thus increased in 33.5 billion dollars between 2004 and 2010 of which soy 
products accounted for 36.7 percent. While at the start of the millennium the soybean 
sector only accounted for 14 per cent of exports, this had risen to over 26 per cent by 
the end of the decade (Rivera-Quiñones, 2014: 75). The production of biodiesel in 
Argentina increased by 1500 percent between 2006 and 2012, and 650 percent in 
Brazil. At the same time ethanol production in Brazil has also increased by 40 percent 
between 2003 and 2012  (Fulquet, 2015: 50–51). These developments have been 
actively promoted by progressive governments who have created a number of state 
institutions, policies and incentives strengthening the agribusiness sector (Fulquet, 
2015; Rivera-Quiñones, 2014; Vergara-Camus, 2015).  
 
Given the increases in natural resource exploitation at the national level, it is not 
surprising that regional cooperation, too, has become ‘resource-driven’ (Saguier, 
2012: 126) and following Brazil’s lead at the start of the millennium South American 
governments launched IIRSA. This large-scale South America-wide initiative aims at 
improving the transport, energy and communications infrastructure, not least in order 
to facilitate commodity exports. With a budget of over US $ 95 billion and over 500 
planned projects which are often in frontier areas, the initiative aims to overcome 
considerable geographical barriers like the Andes or the Amazon basin (Carciofi, 
2012; Garzón and Schilling-Vacaflor, 2012; Saguier, 2012: 130). 
 
The second common trend is that progressive governments have strengthened the role 
of the state in the governance of natural resources and have used revenues from the 
export of commodities for much needed social programmes in the areas of poverty 
reduction, education or health. In Argentina for example a 20 per cent tax on exports 
of agricultural commodities and hydrocarbons was crucial to fund social emergency 
programmes following the 2001 crisis (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2007: 96). Since then 
the revenues generated by the rapidly expanding soybean export sector have played a 
crucial role in providing Argentinean progressive governments with the fiscal space 
needed for social programmes (Rivera-Quiñones, 2014). In Uruguay and Brazil too, 
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governments used the commodity boom and the strengthened economy to expand 
social programmes (Gudynas, 2009: 208; Zibechi, 2010: 107–108). Under the Bolsa 
Familia programme the Lula government thus extended social spending to over 
eleven million families, providing financial support under the condition that children 
attend school (Branford, 2009: 161). In the Andean countries of Ecuador and Bolivia 
progressive governments have renegotiated contracts in relation to subsoil resources 
and have used the revenues for expanding welfare programmes (Grugel and 
Riggirozzi, 2012: 8–9; Wolff, 2013: 41). In the case of Bolivia state revenues from the 
hydrocarbon sector have thus increased four-fold in the time period of 2006-2011 
compared to the previous five years (Pellegrini and Ribera Arismendi, 2012: 108). 
Overall, such programmes have been successful in curbing extreme poverty and 
reducing inequality to some extent (Burchardt and Dietz, 2014: 473–474), although 
given the low starting point in terms of social spending, it has also been relatively 
easy for progressive governments to ‘score quick wins’ (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012: 
8). 
 
A final common element is that progressive governments across South America have 
been much less successful in terms of employing other strategies to address social 
concerns and inequality. In particular, progressive governments have not introduced 
significant changes to the very regressive taxation systems in place across South 
America (Burchardt and Dietz, 2014: 475; Cortés, 2009: 63) Consequently, the Inter-
American Development Bank has characterised the existing taxation systems in Latin 
America as a ‘missed opportunity’ (IDB, 2013: iii) which could be used much more 
effectively to address the high levels of income inequality and contribute to 
development more broadly. All in all it is therefore clear that progressive governments 
across South America have come to rely on neo-extractivism as their main strategy for 
economic and social development (Burchardt and Dietz, 2014).  
 
NEO-EXTRACTIVISM AND DEMOCRACY: INCREASING LEGITIMACY 
AND PARTICIPATION? 
 
The adoption of neo-extractivism as a development strategy has had complex and 
contradictory impacts on the quality of democracy. This section focuses on the 
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democratic legitimacy of progressive governments and outlines how neo-extractivism 
has allowed leftist governments to gain a relatively high level of legitimacy largely as 
a result of the social programmes implemented (Gudynas, 2009). In the Andean-
Amazonian countries of Ecuador and Bolivia this has been underpinned by important 
constitutional changes strengthening the rights of indigenous people. Under 
progressive governments states have thus become more inclusive and responsive to 
the concerns of previously highly marginalised parts of the population partly as a 
result of the revenues generated from neo-extractivism. This has been a significant 
element in the popularity of leftist governments and their re-election in several 
countries. 
 
Political legitimacy is particularly important given that the election of leftist 
governments across South America has followed on from widespread protests against 
the neoliberal agenda pursued by previous governments and a widespread perception 
of the lacking democratic legitimacy of these governments. The liberal democracies 
established in South America in the 1980s and 1990s focussed on the procedural 
elements of democracy, notably voting and elections, but did not give the state any 
responsibility in terms of guaranteeing economic or social rights. Moreover, there was 
an expectation that the political leaders elected would recognise that neoliberal 
reforms represented the only path for economic development, so that the outcome of 
elections should not affect the policy reforms put in place. The consolidation of 
democracy was thus closely linked to neoliberal economic reforms where the role of 
the state primarily consisted of guaranteeing private property rights while social 
concerns and redistribution were off the agenda. At the same time governments 
repeatedly dismissed the concerns of poorer parts of the population as well as some 
middle-class issues (Silva, 2009: 25–28), exacerbating feelings of injustice and 
lacking democratic legitimacy.  
 
Ultimately this brought down neoliberal governments in a number of South American 
countries and paved the way for the election of progressive governments. Many of the 
South American Leftist presidents have their roots in social movements and have 
come to power with the support of social movements (Prevost et al., 2012: 12–14) and 
on explicitly anti-neoliberal platforms (Panizza, 2009: 182–183). Reacting against the 
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neoliberal reform agenda and its elitist practices of decision making, a commitment to 
democratic innovation and new possibilities of engaging civil society in decision 
making is therefore an important element in the approach of progressive governments 
(Brabazon and Webber, 2014: 436; Cannon and Kirby, 2012; Riggirozzi, 2012). 
 
Natural resources are a crucial element in this respect as many South American 
citizens regarded the privatisation of natural resources under neoliberal governments 
as unfair and believed that the mineral wealth of their countries should benefit the 
people rather than foreign investors (Hogenboom, 2012; Perreault, 2008). Responding 
to citizen demands that natural resources should be treated as ‘national’ resources 
(Perreault, 2008: 249) by turning them into a source of revenue for social programmes 
has thus been an important cornerstone supporting the political legitimacy of 
progressive governments. At the same time, neo-extractivism as a development 
strategy has allowed progressive governments to make the liberal democracies 
established previously more inclusive by taking into account the concerns of poor 
people frequently ignored by previous governments (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, some progressive governments, particularly in the Andean-Amazonian 
countries, have taken steps towards changing the institutions and functioning of 
liberal democracy by adding new forms of participation and governance (Wolff, 
2013). Specifically, the new constitutions adopted by governments in Bolivia and 
Ecuador have stressed the importance of indigenous rights, social justice and 
participation. The 2009 constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia became a 
leading example worldwide in recognising the rights of indigenous peoples (Schilling-
Vacaflor, 2013: 202) while the Ecuadorian constitution adopted in 2008 is 
groundbreaking in formally recognising the rights of nature and giving a central space 
to indigenous perspectives on the relationship between humans and nature (Arsel, 
2012). These constitutional changes are significant in strengthening the rights of 
citizens who had been highly marginalised for centuries and this has also increased 
their possibilities to mobilise and hold the state to account (Haarstad, 2012c: 244). 
These constitutional innovations constitute a move away from elitist practices of 
decision-making and provide substance to the self-stated commitment of progressive 
governments to improve the quality of democracy. Yet, when looking at the practices 
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of decision-making under progressive governments a number of contradictions 
emerge which are particularly salient in the area of natural resource governance. 
 
REQUIRING MORE SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACY: CONTESTATIONS 
OVER NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE 
 
Notwithstanding the increases in perceptions of legitimacy under progressive 
governments, natural resource governance remains highly contested and some 
analysts have noted an ‘explosion of socio-environmental conflicts’ (Svampa, 2012: 
19). Evidently, the contestations over resource governance encompass a multitude of 
different local context conditions, constellations of actors and demands which cannot 
be examined in detail in one paper. The citizens and civil society organisations 
protesting against particular projects of resource exploitation come from different 
backgrounds including indigenous groups, communities directly affected by resource 
exploitation and environmental NGOs, and they express a wide range of concerns 
such as access to land and natural resources, impacts on human health and livelihoods, 
demands for compensation, and environmental conservation (Svampa, 2012: 19–21).  
 
Nevertheless, there are again some common trends which are significant for 
examining the quality of democracy in South American post-neoliberal states. In 
many cases what citizens and civil society organisations demand is thus not 
necessarily a complete stop to natural resource exploitation in principle, but a say in 
decision-making, for example in relation to the location and extent of extractivist 
projects, the mitigation of negative impacts or the distribution of burdens and benefits 
arising from intensive resource exploitation. Moreover, some of the civil society 
organisations and networks contesting resource governance have developed new 
frames of reference and discourses representing alternative understandings of 
development or sustainability (Svampa, 2012: 26). 
 
The origins of the multiple contestations over resource governance therefore lie 
largely in the widespread dissatisfaction in relation to decision-making practices in 
resource governance and uncover shortcomings in the way democracy functions. 
Consequently, focussing on regular elections and formal democratic institutions alone 
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is not sufficient to understand the nature of the conflicts over resource governance. 
Instead, I build on the notion of substantive democracy which captures two elements 
in particular which are crucial to understand the nature of the contestations over 
resource governance; the ability of citizens to have a say in decisions directly 
affecting them and to contribute to major debates in society; and the ability of states to 
take a variety of positions into account and mediate in situations of conflict.  
 
Substantive democracy has been defined as ‘a way of regulating power relations in 
such a way as to maximize the opportunities for individuals to influence the 
conditions in which they live, to participate in and influence debates about the key 
decisions which affect society’ (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 1997: 62). This captures several 
aspects which are highly relevant to understand the ongoing protests over resource 
governance across South America. First, it calls for as many opportunities as possible 
for participation in decision-making. Casting a vote in elections every few years 
should thus not be the only way citizens can participate. This is particularly important 
in relation to two types of decisions; first decisions directly affecting citizens’ 
environments and livelihoods; and second decisions regarding central debates 
affecting society as a whole. Clearly, this is highly relevant in relation to natural 
resource exploitation which frequently has very direct impacts on local communities 
and which is at the heart of development strategies, one of the central issues for South 
American societies. This is also closely related to the idea of social citizenship and 
citizenship rights, including the right to have a say in decisions directly affecting 
citizens (Grugel, 1999: 159). Social citizenship has also been defined as having ‘a 
voice in the allocation of public resources rather than in the designation of public 
authorities’ (Arditi, 2008: 76). In a situation where natural resources form the basis of 
public resources, this can be extended to having a say in whether, to what extent and 
how natural resources are exploited. Giving citizens a greater say in order to build 
more substantive democracy would also imply a redistribution of power (Grugel, 
2001: 5). In the context of natural resource governance, this relates to the control over 
resources. A second important element of substantive democracy relates to the role of 
the state and its ability to take a variety of positions into account; and to be flexible 
and able to mediate in situations of conflict (Grugel, 2001: 243–244). Again, this is 
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highly relevant in relation to the variety of concerns expressed in relation to natural 
resource exploitation.  
 
In the Andean-Amazonian countries increasingly intensive exploitation of sub-soil 
resources such as gas, petroleum and metals has repeatedly led to contestations by 
affected communities and civil society organisations which have been relatively well 
researched (Bebbington, 2012a; Haarstad, 2012b; Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014). In 
many cases the areas opened up for resource exploitation overlap with indigenous 
territories and/or protected areas. According to EJOLT2 out of 342 environmental 
justice conflicts currently registered for South America, 197 conflicts are located in 
the Andean-Amazonian countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela 
(EJOLT, 2015). However, in many cases protests are not against resource exploitation 
per se, but rather demonstrate various and complex claims over territory, sovereignty 
and compensation. Such claims are made in relation to both, the state and companies 
carrying out resource exploitation. Instead of wanting to halt extraction completely, 
protestors look for ‘a form of extraction that respects them, their cultures, their 
livelihoods and their territorial claims’ (Bebbington, 2012c: 224). Important concerns 
of those challenging extraction of subsoil resources are thus the distribution of costs 
and benefits of extraction and real possibilities for participation in decision making. 
 
While fewer conflicts have been reported in relation to the Southern Cone region of 
Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and the south of Brazil, the spread of intensive 
agriculture and consolidation of agribusiness has not been uncontested. Across the 
Southern Cone communities living in areas of intensive agricultural production have 
been concerned about the impact of agro-chemicals on human health (Robinson, 
2008: 89; Wandscheer, 2009). In Argentina for example specialists from various 
branches of medicine have concluded that exposure to pesticides used in the region 
increases health risks, in particular cancer, miscarriages, malformations and impaired 
fertility. Affected communities and citizen associations have used these arguments to 
protest against fumigation by air and to take farmers using agro-chemicals to court 
                                                 
2
 EJOLT is a global research project analysing ecological distribution conflicts. The project compiles 
an environmental justice atlas and database of environmental conflicts regularly updated by researchers 
and civil society all over the world. 
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(Cáceres, 2014: 19; Giarracca and Teubal, 2014: 60–61). Moreover, environmental 
organisations in various Southern Cone countries have stated their opposition to the 
use of GMOs and have put biosafety on the top of their agendas (Newell, 2008: 351–
352). 
 
Intensive agricultural production as it is pursued in the Southern Cone and the 
increasing power of agribusiness have also been challenged on the grounds of wider 
social issues and in particular the distribution of wealth and assets. Conflicts over land 
between peasants and indigenous communities on the one hand and agribusiness on 
the other have thus intensified in many places in the region over the past decade and 
have become particularly salient in Paraguay (Cáceres, 2014; Giarracca and Teubal, 
2014: 58; Segovia, 2009; Yanosky, 2013). In June 2012 it was also a conflict of this 
nature and the question of land rights more generally that led to the impeachment of 
the Paraguayan president at the time, Fernando Lugo, demonstrating the importance 
of the issue for Paraguayan politics (Lambert and Nickson, 2013). In addition to land 
rights, regional civil society networks have also drawn attention to the right to water 
and argued that this is equally threatened by the significant deterioration of the water 
quality as a result of land use changes (Celiberti and Taks, 2009; Iglesias and Taks, 
2009). Moreover, the landless movement in Brazil has highlighted the importance of 
food sovereignty (Newell, 2008: 352), an issue that is equally threatened by the 
expansion of export-oriented agricultural production. 
 
Civil society organisations have also been concerned about the increase in agricultural 
production over the last two decades because this has led to an expansion of the 
agricultural frontier, with soybean plantations either directly pushing into new areas, 
such as the Brazilian Cerrado, one of the biologically richest savannas in the world 
(Wolford, 2008), or displacing traditional activities, notably cattle-ranching, and 
pushing these into new areas. These processes are also associated with large-scale 
deforestation across the Southern Cone (Cáceres, 2014: 8; Fulquet, 2015: 49; 
Giarracca and Teubal, 2014: 58). To counteract this trend regional networks of 
environmental NGOs have for example created the Grasslands Alliance with the aim 
of promoting alternative and more environmentally sustainable ways of agricultural 
production (Grasslands Alliance, 2015; Siegel, 2014: 146-169).  
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Finally, IIRSA, the largest regional project promoting resource exploitation in South 
America has also been heavily contested. Many IIRSA projects are large-scale and in 
remote areas and thus have significant consequences for the lives of people and the 
physical environment. Although some assessments of environmental and social 
impact have been carried out, these have come late and have been applied 
inconsistently, thus not meeting the ambitious targets that had been set (Hochstetler, 
2011: 143–144, 2013: 43–44). Due to the social and environmental impacts and the 
lack of effective consultation mechanisms, IIRSA has faced large-scale regional 
opposition of civil society groups and affected communities (Garzón and Schilling-
Vacaflor, 2012; Hochstetler, 2011: 144; Saguier, 2012: 134–135). Overall, the new 
forms of regional integration that have been developed over the last decade have 
therefore not been matched by corresponding regional institutional channels to 
address socio-environmental concerns. 
 
In the first instance, these contestations of course demonstrate the significant 
grievances of communities directly affected by intensive resource exploitation and the 
concerns of groups wishing to promote socio-environmental objectives. However, 
taken together they also demonstrate shortcomings in the way liberal democracy 
functions in South American post-neoliberal states, exposing citizen demands which 
go beyond casting a vote for designated representatives every few years. Instead 
citizens demand a say in decisions directly affecting them and advocate that a wider 
range of concerns should be taken into account in natural resource governance. 
Moreover, some civil society organisations put forward alternative conceptions of 
development and sustainability. All of these elements demonstrate a need for more 
substantive democracy which takes into account a variety of concerns and gives 
citizens a say in decisions with immediate impacts on their livelihoods and in broader 
societal debates. 
 
UNCOVERING THE LIMITATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC INNOVATION 
UNDER NEO-EXTRACTIVISM: THE RESPONSES OF GOVERNMENTS 
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While neo-extractivism has allowed progressive governments to respond to some of 
the criticisms of democracy under neoliberalism by redirecting some revenues to 
social programmes and making states more inclusive, the government responses to the 
multiple contestations over resource exploitation clearly demonstrate the limitations in 
terms of building more substantive democracies. The approach of progressive 
governments to natural resource governance demonstrate a common trend combining 
two elements; on the one hand, different types of discourses justifying intensive 
resource exploitation towards the outside often with the support of international and 
domestic business; and on the other hand an internal prioritisation of intensive 
resource exploitation over other concerns. This approach has hindered the 
development of more substantive democracy taking into account the various concerns 
expressed by civil society groups and giving citizens a say in decisions directly 
affecting them. It has also served to shut down rather than open up the space for 
public debates on resource governance and on the development model adopted. In this 
context alternative discourses and conceptions of development have remained 
marginal and have not been able to generate wider debates in society (Svampa, 2012: 
26) while public opinion has been relatively favourable (Gudynas, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the multiple contestations over resource governance clearly demonstrate 
that a range of citizen concerns exist which are difficult to address without imposing 
limitations to intensive resource exploitation. Significantly, such concerns are often 
expressed by minority groups with limited access to decision-making processes 
(Gudynas, 2014: 151). As a consequence it is difficult to say to what extent there is a 
social consensus on neo-extractivism as the main development strategy. Finally, the 
adherence to neo-extractivism has also meant that there has not been any significant 
redistribution of power in relation to the control over resources. This has made 
progressive governments vulnerable to charges of abandoning objectives they had 
held previously. 
 
Justifying intensive resource exploitation 
 
Progressive governments have used a variety of discourses to defend intensive 
resource exploitation referring to the need to address poverty and the abundance of 
resources available as well as particular sets of scientific knowledge and framings. 
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Given the strengthening of indigenous rights that has taken place simultaneously, 
some of the most surprising and frequently cited verbal responses to protestors have 
come from progressive governments in the Andean-Amazonian countries. In Bolivia, 
President Evo Morales has thus stated ‘what then is Bolivia going to live off if some 
NGOs say “Amazonia without oil”…They are saying, in other words, that the 
Bolivian people ought not have money, that there should be neither Impuesto Directo 
a Hidrocarburos [Direct Hydrocarbons Tax] nor royalties, and also that there should 
be no Juancito Pinto, Renta Dignidad nor Juana Azurduy programmes’ (as quoted in 
Bebbington, 2012b: 10)3. In neighbouring Ecuador President Rafael Correa has stated 
that it would be stupid and irresponsible not to exploit the resources available and 
‘beg while sitting on a sack of gold’ (Gudynas, 2010a: 65, author’s translation). 
Furthermore, indigenous communities in Bolivia asking for respect for indigenous 
issues, territorial claims and consultation were accused of being part of the ‘fascist 
right that seeks to hinder the development’ of the country (Bebbington, 2012b: 11) 
while Correa has labelled protestors ‘extortionists’, ‘terrorists’ or ‘infantile leftists and 
romantic ecologists’ (Bebbington, 2012b: 11–12). Such declarations can be seen as an 
attempt on the part of governments to justify intensive resource exploitation and shut 
down public debates over resource governance, by presenting a discourse of no 
alternative where natural resource governance is seen as a choice between 
environmental protection and poverty reduction and where critical points of view are 
discredited. This approach does not engage with the different concerns put forward by 
civil society and it makes public debates all the more polarized while making it easier 
to dismiss citizen concerns and leaving no space to discuss the overarching strategy of 
development.  
 
In the Southern Cone governments, transnational companies and large parts of the 
media have converged to defend the expansion of large-scale intensive agriculture 
with reference to a particular set of scientific frames and expert knowledge and more 
recently also climate change and the need to develop ‘clean’ sources of energy. In 
relation to the Brazilian Cerrado, the dominant discourse of journalists, policy makers 
and academics established that large-scale intensive agriculture is a ‘logical’ response 
                                                 
3
 Juancito Pinto, Renta Dignidad and Juana Azurduy are social assistance programmes. See 
also (Gudynas, 2010a: 67) 
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to the characteristics of this area because the soil needs intensive treatment and the 
flat topography makes it ideal for the use of machinery (Wolford, 2008: 216). 
Moreover, Brazil’s former president Lula of the Worker’s Party has repeatedly 
praised the benefits of biofuel production stressing economic and social benefits in 
national and international forums (Vergara-Camus, 2015: 230–233). In Argentina too, 
agroindustrial experts who promote intensive agriculture and the use of GMOs with 
reference to scientific arguments have played a central part in the expansion of 
intensive agriculture and its justification (Córdoba, 2014: 6). Moreover, the 
agribusiness sector has been successful in building strong ties with policy makers and 
biotechnology corporations benefit from close links with the government and formal 
access to decision making. Together with their enormous material resources this 
means that transnational companies are in a strong position to shape government 
agendas. Biotechnology corporations have also used their influence and resources to 
access and sponsor mass media, resulting in a discourse in favour of GM technology 
which dominates the political and public sphere (Newell, 2009). Finally, increasing 
concerns about climate change and a search for ‘clean’ energy in countries of the 
global North has provided further justifications for developing biofuel production in 
the Southern Cone countries (Fulquet, 2015: 49). 
 
At the regional level the prominent discourse has focussed on the abundance of 
resources available and the role of national governments in exploiting these. In June 
2013 the regional organisation Unasur thus held a meeting with the objective of 
developing a joint strategy for the exploitation of natural resources in South America. 
The discourse put forward at this meeting stressed the existence of abundant resources 
which need to be exploited to guarantee the well-being of the people and which are so 
vast that they can satisfy the demands of the region and requirements of countries 
outside the region. Moreover, the meeting reaffirmed the position of the nation-states 
as the owners of natural resources (Secretaría General de la UNASUR, 2013). The 
position agreed by governments across the region thus defends an economic model 
based on the export of natural resources and stresses that the national level and 
therefore the governments themselves rather than affected communities, is the 
appropriate scale to take decisions in relation to natural resource governance. The 
Unasur meeting in 2013 partly echoed the conclusions of another regional meeting a 
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few years earlier, the ALBA summit in 2010. Here, South American leaders from 
across the political spectrum had agreed that the right to prior consultation of 
communities affected by resource exploitation was a regrettable obstacle for policies 
decided at the national level (Haarstad and Campero, 2012: 100). At the same time, 
socio-environmental impacts or potential risks as well as the positions of civil society 
do not seem to receive a lot of attention. On the contrary, references to the vast extent 
of resources available are a way of implying that scarcity or degradation of resources 
is not a problem (Gudynas, 2011: 64–65).  
 
Internal prioritisation of intensive resource exploitation 
 
The external justification of intensive resource exploitation has gone hand in hand 
with an internal prioritisation of resource extraction over other concerns. This has also 
meant that a redistribution of power in relation to the control over natural resources 
has been very limited. Although environmental concerns have gained a more 
prominent place on political agendas of most South American states following the 
return to democracy in the 1980s, environmental agencies often suffer from a weak 
institutional position and very limited resources (Mumme and Korzetz, 1997). 
According to Gudynas (Gudynas, 2014: 143–144) the focus on extractivism has 
further isolated environmental agencies and in the Uruguayan case for example, led to 
its dismantling under progressive president Mujica. Meanwhile the regional Unasur 
organisation which was established in the last decade, has councils on a number of 
policy areas, including energy, health or social development, but there is no council 
dedicated to socio-environmental concerns.  
 
Furthermore, the resignation of ministers or high-level officials promoting more 
stringent environmental protection and limiting the scale or intensity of resource 
exploitation has been a recurring pattern in South American progressive governments. 
This includes Marina Silva, a well-respected environmentalist who became Brazil’s 
Environment Minister during the first Lula government in 2003. However, after 
frequently being overruled within the administration, disagreements over planned 
infrastructure developments in the Amazon played a key role in her resignation five 
years later (Branford, 2009: 166–168; Hochstetler and Keck, 2007: 178–180). In 
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Ecuador Alberto Acosta who had close links with environmental and indigenous 
movements and questioned the country’s reliance on resource extraction, was initially 
Minister of Mining and Energy in the Correa government, but left due to 
disagreements with Correa over resource extraction (Humphreys Bebbington and 
Bebbington, 2012: 28–29; Moore and Velásquez, 2012). Meanwhile, in Bolivia, the 
vice minister of the environment and a subdirector both stood down from their 
positions in the Morales government as they did not want to support the TIPNIS 
project (Humphreys Bebbington and Bebbington, 2012: 27). Finally, in Argentina the 
absence of a strategy to address climate change led Raúl Estrada Oyuela, a high-level 
diplomat in the Foreign Office working on the topic, to comment that Argentina did 
not have an environmental policy. He criticized the country’s lack of data on 
environmental concerns and commented that it is not possible to regulate mining or 
industry. Shortly afterwards his position was abolished, but there was no response as 
to what the environmental policy consists of (Estrada Oyuela, 2009; Obarrio, 2007). 
 
The prioritisation of intensive resource exploitation has also led to a series of 
contradictions and limited a redistribution of power with regards to the control of 
natural resources. In Bolivia the right of indigenous communities to free prior and 
informed consultation in relation to the exploitation of natural resources is enshrined 
in the new constitution that was adopted by popular referendum in 2009 and the 
Hydrocarbon Law of 2005. Yet, when it comes to decision-making in practice, the 
picture is far more problematic. Schilling-Vacaflor (2013) thus found that meaningful 
possibilities for participation in decision-making in the hydrocarbon sector have 
remained very limited in particular because consultation took place only very late in 
the planning process and withholding consent did not appear to be a viable option for 
affected communities. Consequently, communities could only negotiate over the 
details of implementation and compensation payments while larger debates over the 
development model adopted by the Bolivian state remained firmly off the agenda. 
Several studies have noted that the origins for the shortcomings in the consultation 
procedures lie in the development model adopted by the Bolivian government which 
prioritises resource extraction and related infrastructure projects over alternative 
visions of development because the state depends on income from the resource sector 
for its social programmes (Pellegrini and Ribera Arismendi, 2012: 115; Schilling-
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Vacaflor, 2013: 216). In Ecuador, indigenous, campesino and environmental activists 
and lawyers argued that a law approved in 2009 favouring large-scale mining 
contradicted indigenous principles enshrined in the new constitution adopted the year 
before (Moore and Velásquez, 2012: 127). 
 
Contradictions are also evident in the Southern Cone, particularly in relation to the 
question of land reform. Brazil thus adopted GMO technology which transnational 
agricultural companies strongly pushed for, under Leftist President Lula despite the 
fact that he had previously criticized this type of agricultural production (Gudynas, 
2010b: 38; Hochstetler and Keck, 2007: 180). Moreover, following his election 
victory Lula introduced some changes, but overall took a far more moderate approach 
on the question of land reform than he had advocated previously, thus disappointing 
the hopes of the landless movement who had supported him in the 2002 election 
(Branford, 2009; Newell, 2008). Several authors thus see a clear link between the 
expansion of agribusiness and the lack of land reform under both, Lula and his 
successor from the Worker’s Party Dilma Rousseff who has been the Brazilian 
President since 2011 (Fulquet, 2015: 47–48; Vergara-Camus, 2015: 229). Similarly, 
in Bolivia land reform under the Morales government has been very limited while 
medium and large enterprises have continued to thrive (Brabazon and Webber, 2014). 
Overall, the prioritisation of increasingly intensive and extensive resource exploitation 
over other concerns on the part of progressive governments has severely limited the 
possibilities of post-neoliberal states in building more substantive democracies. The 
reliance on neo-extractivism makes it difficult to take multiple views on natural 
resource governance into account and does not encourage a redistribution of control 
over natural resources.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has argued that the increasingly intensive and extensive resource 
exploitation that forms the basis of the development strategy adopted by progressive 
governments in South America over the past 15 years is hard to reconcile with the 
variety of concerns expressed by citizens in relation to natural resource governance. 
Accommodating the different positions expressed by citizens would require setting 
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some limitations to the extent of resource exploitation; yet this is difficult as long as 
neo-extractivism is the main development strategy. While neo-extractivism has thus 
led to some increases in the legitimacy of progressive governments, the building of 
more substantive democracies giving citizens a say in decisions directly affecting 
them, encouraging public debates on key questions confronting society and taking 
into account a variety of concerns, remains elusive.  
 
This also raises the question of why progressive governments continue to rely on neo-
extractivism as the main strategy for development. After all the contestations over 
resource governance have often alienated former allies and led to new divisions 
within the left. At the same time progressive governments also face significant 
challenges by the right which is evident for example in the recent protests against the 
Rousseff government in Brazil (Saad-Filho, 2015). On the one hand, the contestations 
over resource governance demonstrate that building democracy is a messy and 
incremental process. Democratisation is not a linear process as Cannon and Hume 
also demonstrate in their analysis of Central American progressive governments 
(Cannon and Hume, 2012). This makes contradictions more likely. On the other hand, 
analysing contestations over resource governance in South America also points to 
important constraints imposed by international and domestic business actors which 
deserve more attention in future studies. In Bolivia representatives of transnational 
and domestic corporations thus lobbied against the strengthening of indigenous rights 
(Schilling-Vacaflor, 2014: 9) while in Ecuador Canadian companies and politicians 
lobbied in favour of contentious mining projects (Moore and Velásquez, 2012). At the 
same time, bilateral investment treaties grant foreign investors significant protection 
while limiting the policy tools available to governments (Haarstad and Campero, 
2012). In Argentina, the US embassy promoted the interests of TNCs and in particular 
Monsanto (Zenteno Hopp et al., 2015: 86).  
 
Business interests thus represent a powerful lobby which is sometimes supported by 
Northern governments and which can present a strong opposition to changing 
practices in decision-making and giving citizens a greater say. Neo-extractivism has 
therefore also allowed progressive governments to maintain a fragile equilibrium 
keeping domestic and international business interests satisfied while implementing a 
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minimum of social programmes. In this context, perhaps progressive governments 
have come to regard neo-extractivism as ‘their only option’ (Bebbington, 2012c: 222; 
Schilling-Vacaflor, 2013: 204). This would confirm that substantive democracy in 
marginalized regions of the global South is hard to achieve in the context of 
globalized capitalism (Grugel, 2001: 10; 241) as even governments committed to 
deepening democracy in a favourable economic context seem to find their margin to 
manoeuvre restricted. Yet, business interests include many different groups with very 
different objectives and relationships to the state and communities affected by 
resource exploitation. The impact on decision-making procedures and democratic 
quality is therefore likely to be uneven and needs to be examined further through 
more systematic research. 
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